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correct in observing that if a distinction is to be drawn between the
negligence of one who lends his car and one who gives his car to a
known incompetent or reckless driver, "the more reasonable view
would suggest that one who gives an automobile to a known incompetent driver, placing in him the power to use it at any and all times,
drunk or sober, sane, or insane, is more negligent than one who merely
lends the vehicle for one specific occasion." 15 The mere passing of
title does not change the character of the negligence of the defendant,
and it is submitted that the law should not operate to relieve him of his
responsibility for the natural and probable consequences of his own
negligent act.
C. GIBSON DoWNING, JI.

WORKER'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO CROSS A PICKET LINE
National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
Inc.,' was brought to the United States Supreme Court by a grant of
certiorari2 to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
which had denied the enforcement of a National Labor Relations
Board order.3 This order sought to have one Charles Waugh reinstated as a chauffeur and routeman of the respondent, Rockaway News
Supply Co., Inc.4
Waugh, an employee of respondent for seven years, had the job
of driving a truck along a regular route picking up and delivering
certain newspapers. He, like others similarly employed, was a member
of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York and
Vicinity.
On the morning of Thursday, March 2, 1950, Waugh learned that
a union, other than the one of which he was a member, had placed
pickets before the premises of the Daily Review Corporation, a plant
which his duties required him to enter. He immediately went to his
foreman and stated that, as a union member, he would not cross the
picket line, but would pick up the consignments of the strike bound
plant if they were brought to a point outside the picket line. This
was done for two days, but on the third day the foreman told him that
"257 S. W. 2d 604, 608.

'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345

U. S. 71 (1952).

-344 U. S. 863 (1952).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 197
F. 2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 95
N. L. R. B. 336 (1951).
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this arrangement was not satisfactory and that he must cross the picket
line or be fired. Persisting in his refusal, Waugh left respondents
premises, and although he returned each day for about three weeks,
he was never rehired. Waugh was the only employee of the respondent who refused to cross the picket line.
-Respondent for some years had recognized the Newspaper and
Mail Deliverers' Union of New York and Vicinity, of which Waugh
was a member, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. The contract between them contained, among other things,
a no-strike, no-walkout clause and a provision that any dispute arising
under the contract be arbitrated. A hearing was held upon Waugh's
grievance and the arbitration board made an award in favor of the

employer.
Shortly thereafter, Waugh filed a charge with the National Labor
Relations Board and a complaint against the respondent was issued.
The Board on various grounds not material here declared invalid the
entire contract between respondent and the union, including the nostrike clause.5 It ordered Waugh reinstated with back pay on the
basis that he had a right guaranteed by See. 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended,6 to refuse to cross the picket line, and that
respondent had violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3)7 of said Act. The
Board then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for enforcement of the order.
The majority of that court s refused to enforce the Board's order,
stating the question before them as follows:
It will thus be seen that this case squarely presents the question
whether it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an
employee who refuses to obey the employer's orders to perform that
95 N. L. R. B. 336 (1951). The Board stated: "The Respondent urges
that Waugh's refusal to cross the picket line violated the no-strike clause of its
agreement with the Union, and that his discharge was therefore not protected by
the Act. In Rockaway News Supply Company, Inc. (94 N. L. R. B. 1056), the
Board found the identical contract involved herein to be illegal in its entirety and
set it aside. It would not effectuate the policies of the Act to give effect in this
case to a contract which the Board set aside in its entirety in a prior proceeding.
Accordingly, the no-strike clause of that contract can have no impact upon
Waugh's refusal to cross the picket line ......
'29 U. S. C. sec. 157 (Supp. 1953): 'Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities, for the purpose 6f collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
'29 U. S. C. see. 158 (a) (1) and (3) (Supp. 1953) states: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer:
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercises of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization...."
'Judges Chase and Mars. Judge Clark dissented.
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part of his regular daily duties which involve his crossing the picket
line of another plant than that of his employer.'

The Court of Appeals, in answering this question, approved the
Board's contention that refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's plant is an exercise of "'. . . the right to . ..assist labor
organizations .. .and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of . ..mutual aid or protection'; which is expressly guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act."10 However, the court came to the conclusion that while a worker is free to exercise his right to refuse to
cross such a picket line (it being a right guaranteed by Section 7)
when he is on his own free time, he has no right to engage in union
activities on working time when such activities are in violation of the
employer's working rules, as by failing to carry out regular duties
when such duties require him to cross a picket line at another employer's plant. Thus an employee's duty to his employer is paramount,
and discharging him for failure to carry out regular duties will not
be an unfair labor practice.
The National Labor Relations Board argued that Waugh's individual refusal to cross the picket line cannot be regarded as a violation
of the Act or as convicting his union of an unfair labor practice. They
based this contention on the proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the
National Labor Relations Act as amended. That section deals with
union unfair labor practices and the proviso contained therein as follows:
... Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the
premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved
by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act.. ..'

The Court agreed, but held that even though Waugh's refusal was
not a violation of the Act, it was none the less a violation of his obligation to his employer to perform his duties and was thus a valid basis
for his discharge, citing National Labor Relations Board v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co.12 as supporting its position.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.13 In sustaining the decision of the lower court, the majority' 4 gave considerable weight to the fact that at the time of the dispute the collective
bargaining contract between the employer and the union had not yet
'Supra note 3 at 112-113.
'o Supra note 3 at 113.
"29 U. S. C. (1946 Ed., Supp. V), 8 sec. 158 (b) (4) (D).
"189 F. 2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951).
' Supra note 2.
1
,Justice Jackson delivered the majority opinion. Justices Black, Douglas and
Minton dissented.
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been declared invalid. The court was of the opinion that therefore
the contract was controlling and the no-strike clause therein removed
any basis for holding the discharge of Waugh to be an unfair labor
practice. 15 They also pointed out that the no-strike clause was in and
of itself unobjectionable, and that the Board had improperly ignored
the savings and separability provisions in declaring the contract invalid on the basis of its containing other clauses which, though objectionable, had no bearing on this dispute.16 As to the proviso, the Supreme Court held that it gave the contracting parties a right to embody
in their contract either a provision requiring employees to cross a
picket line or a provision to the contrary, or neither provision, as desired. The Court added that breach of the first type of provision may
be made grounds for discharge without violating Section 7 of the Act,
7
citing National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co.,'
and found that the no-strike clause in the instant case constituted
such a provision.
The Supreme Court limited its decision in this case by saying:
"We therefore consider this controversy to require no determination
of rights or duties respecting picket lines broader than this contract
itself prescribes." 18 Thus, by placing this limitation on its decision
and determining the case on the basis of rights under a contract, the
Supreme Court bypassed an opportunity to throw considerable light
on the nature and extent of the worker's statutory right to refuse to
cross picket lines, except to say that the "right" can be revoked through
a collective bargaining contract containing a no-strike clause.
The dissent called for a different interpretation of the proviso to
Section 8 (b) (4) (D), joining with the Board in claiming that employees had a right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line, a right
which was reserved to them by the proviso. However, there is a great
deal of doubt as to whether the proviso actually grants any rights to
employees, 19 because it (1) comes under Section 8 (b) which deals
only with unfair labor practices on the part of unions and (2) states
' Supra note 1 at 77: 'Even where a statute is unconstitutional and hence

declared void as of the beginning, this Court has held that its existence before it
has been so declared is not to be ignored." [The Waugh dispute arose the first
week in March 1950, while the Board declared the contract invalid on June 5,
1951.
" Supra note 1 at 79: "The employment contract should not be taken out of
the hands of the parties themselves merely because they have misunderstood the
legal limits of their bargain, where the excess may be severed and separately condemned as it can here."
1306 U. S. 332 (1939).
'5Supra note 1 at 79.
For a discussion of the proviso in general see Tower, The Puzzling Proviso,
1 L,,oR L. J. 1079 (Oct. 1950) and Petro, The Enlightening Proviso, 1 LA~on
L. J. 1075 (Nov. 1950).
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merely that it is not unlawful for a worker to refuse to cross a picket
line which is the result of a strike meeting the requirements set out
20
by the proviso.
Therefore, it would seem that the proviso prevents a labor union
from being charged with an unfair labor practice if one of its members, while in the course of his employment, refuses to cross a picket
line. Also, such refusal will not be a violation of the Act 2 ' on the part
of the employee himself. But where the contract under which he is
working has a no-strike clause, the proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) cannot
be interpreted to guarantee him protection against dismissal when he
refuses to carry out the duties of his job, even where his refusal is
based solely upon his reluctance to cross a picket line at another employer's plant. The employee would no doubt be protected if the
contract contained a clause in which the employer agreed not to require employees to cross such a picket line, but it is still an open question whether he would be protected if the contract said nothing one
way or the other. Would his "right" under Section 7 prevail, or would
his "duty" to the employer?
GEORGE D. ScmADER
Supra note 11.

Supra note 3 at 114.

